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Abstract
Agricultural liberalization remains to be the most sensitive
issue in trade negotiations not only because it is tied to the food
security policies of a country but also because the transformations
it brings have social implications, mainly in terms of adjustment
costs. Patterns of rural and urban poverty can largely be traced to
the agricultural policies of a country.
This paper aims to provide some information on the
implications for the Philippine agriculture sector of the ASEAN-
China Free Trade Agreement. In particular, the paper explores
the possible impact of the agreement, with emphasis on the Early
Harvest Program (EHP). It also provides a brief background on
the state of the Philippine agriculture system, the liberalization
initiatives undertaken, as well as some policy gaps and
interventions done to address these. The paper also revisits a
simulation exercise conducted on the possible short-run impact
of an EHP to identify the vulnerable sectors.
To meet the China challenge, as well as the other broader
challenges of globalization, the Philippine agriculture system
should hasten the pace of domestic reforms and restructuring to
maintain international competitiveness, and provide the
foundation for sustained growth. The paper further recommends
for the country to build its own strength and competitiveness to
create a mutually beneficial relationship with China.I
Introduction
Agricultural liberalization remains to be the most sensitive
issue in trade negotiations not only because it is tied to the food
security policies of a country but also because the transformations
it brings have social implications, mainly in terms of adjustment
costs. Patterns of rural and urban poverty can largely be traced to
the agricultural policies of a country.
As a result of policy mistakes in the past, the Philippines
had been cautious with the liberalization of the agriculture sector.
In fact, the country has even prominently figured in the Doha
Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations as
one of the leading developing countries to insist on providing
maximum flexibility to vulnerable sectors and securing maximum
policy space for developing countries in multilateral negotiations1.
When China offered a free trade agreement (FTA) with the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Philippines
became a somewhat reluctant partner. In fact, it was the last of
the ASEAN member states to seal an agreement for an Early
Harvest Program (EHP) with China in 2005.
The ASEAN-China FTA is unique in such a way that while
other FTAs tried to evade the agriculture issue, the agreement
negotiated it in a straightforward manner through the EHP
(Pasadilla 2005). The EHP covers chapters one to eight of the
Harmonized System. Other tariff lines that may be sensitive to
ASEAN countries can be exempted from the EHP as allowed by
the agreement’s provision for an exclusion list and sensitive track
products. This element of the FTA makes it a potential south-south
trading system and a win-win initiative (Bernardino 2004).
Moreover, the ASEAN-China FTA aims at creating closer economic
1Statement made by Department of Agriculture Secretary Segfredo Serrano during the Roundtable Discussion
on Economic and Social Impact of Agriculture Liberalization Under the China-ASEAN FTA.  February 28,
2007, NEDA sa Makati Bldg., Makati City.2
relations between China and the ASEAN by lowering trade and
investment barriers and by carrying out technical and economic
cooperation projects. Such an agreement and cooperation hopes
to enhance the sense of community within the region, reduce
tensions, and contribute to stability (Chia 2004). However, it goes
without saying that the impetus for an ASEAN-China FTA is made
with conscious considerations of political motivations.
The Philippines has its own share of offensive and defensive
interests in this agreement. It cannot be denied that China poses
serious competition to many local industries.  But there is also no
question that it offers a huge potential market for businesses across
the globe that are also actively seeking to obtain a share of this
market. Either way, it is essential for trading partners and
industries to find their own strengths and to work on enhancing
their comparative and competitive advantages. How to enable local
industries, either to cope with the competition or to take advantage
of the huge opportunities, is the challenge that the government
needs to face.
This paper aims to contribute to the discourse by providing
some background information that would help in understanding
the circumstances facing the agreement and the possible
implications for the Philippines. In particular, the paper explores
the possible impact of the ASEAN-China FTA, with emphasis on
the short-run impact of the EHP. It provides a brief background
on the state of the Philippine agriculture system, the liberalization
initiatives undertaken, as well as the policy gaps in the system
and the interventions done to address these. The paper  revisits
the simulation exercise conducted by Prenio et al. (2005) on the
possible short-run impact of an EHP to identify the vulnerable
sectors. The last part provides the conclusion and policy
recommendations on the necessary domestic support and reforms
that the government should undertake to maximize the gains from
this FTA.3
Agriculture is an important sector in the Philippines. It
employs 35 percent of the labor force and accounts for 20 percent
of the gross domestic product (GDP). If linkage with other
agriculture-based sectors is considered, it accounts for close to 40
percent of GDP and employs two-thirds of the labor force (David
1997; Cororaton 2005). However, despite its importance to the
economy, agriculture has been characterized by low growth and
productivity performance. The annual growth rate of the combined
agriculture, fishery, and forestry sector is roughly at 2 percent,
which is barely enough to sustain the food needs of a population
growing at a rate of almost 3 percent.
Agriculture used to be a promising sector with so much
potential. In the 1970s, largely as an offshoot of the Green
Revolution program of the Marcos administration, the Philippines
became a net exporter of agricultural products, representing two-
thirds of the total exports. However, policy bias against the sector,
coupled with the collapse in world commodity prices, stagnated
agricultural growth in the country. The policy bias toward import
substitution led to market distortions that promoted rent-seeking
activities and distorted economic incentives against investments
in agriculture (Cororaton 2004). Deterioration of the sector was
further reinforced by inadequate policies and weak institutional
framework governing agriculture (David 2003).
In the 1990s, patterns in Philippine agriculture took a spin
as exports stagnated and imports increased, making the
Philippines a net importer of agricultural products. David (2003)
attributed this to the country’s fading comparative advantage and
low productivity levels in agriculture.
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The overall poor performance of the Philippine agriculture
sector can be attributed to a number of factors. While weather
disturbances such as El Niño and La Niña are partly responsible,
the unsatisfactory performance of the sector is also largely due to
inadequate policies and weak institutional framework governing
agriculture. Most significant among these are price intervention
policies in the form of export taxes in agriculture. While these
policies had huge revenue potential, they only aggravated the bias
against agriculture in favor of other sectors in the economy,
particularly toward the import-substituting consumer goods (Intal
et al. 1990). Explicit government intervention in pricing and
marketing in agriculture, with the objective of protecting the
domestic economy from instability in world commodity prices,
led to the establishment of government marketing agencies that
had monopoly power for imports and monopsony power for
exports that diverted proceeds from agricultural producers and
created rent-seeking activities (Bautista et al. 2003).
Another factor that strained the sector is inadequate
investment in necessary infrastructure such as irrigation, public
support programs, and research and development (R&D).
Compounding this weakness are poorly designed or
unimplemented programs in agriculture. Irrigation investments
stagnated since the 1980s, while R&D spending declined since
the 1990s. In particular, R&D expenditures accounted only for
0.4 percent of the gross value added (GVA) in agriculture
compared to an average of 1 percent in developing countries
(David 2003; Cororaton 2005; Habito et al. 2005).
Despite intensive reforms undertaken in 1994, targets were
still insufficiently met. Only half of the total appropriation for
irrigation was allocated, with most of these funds going to repairs
of existing irrigation systems instead of building new ones. Only
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381 kilometers of farm-to-market roads were built out of the
projected 8,000 kilometers. Total expenditure for postharvest
facilities bloated up to seven times of the proposed budget, mainly
aimed at providing drying facilities and multipurpose pavements
for farmers’ cooperatives. Also, there had been severe
implementation failures in two government legislations on
modernizing Philippine agriculture (Habito 2005), namely, the
Agricultural Competitiveness Enhancement Fund (ACEF) and the
Agriculture Fisheries Modernization Act (AFMA).6
The government introduced a comprehensive trade reform
program in the 1980s to liberalize trade unilaterally (Balboa et al.
2007). The program spanned more than a decade and was
implemented in three phases up to the 1990s. The first phase, which
was implemented from 1981 to 1985, narrowed down the tariff
structure from a range of 100-0 percent to 50-10 percent. This
was accompanied by the import liberalization program (ILP) that
sought to eliminate nontariff import measures. However,
implementation of the program was stalled by the economic and
political crises in the country in the mid-1980s.
The second phase of trade liberalization aimed at lowering
tariff rates over a five-year period was implemented in 1991. The
program clustered the commodities within a tariff range of 10-30
percent. The following year, in 1992, Executive Order No. 8 was
issued, which provided tariff protection measures to replace
quantitative restrictions (QRs) on the importation of 153
commodities. Said EO placed a scheme that raised the tariff rates
applicable to affected commodities by 100 percent of their pre-EO
levels.
The third and final phase of the unilateral trade reform
took place in 1994. It created a four-tier tariff structure with the
end goal of achieving a low, uniform tariff by 2002. Specifically, it
targeted to achieve the following rates: 3 percent for raw materials
and capital equipment that can be sourced locally; 20 percent for
intermediate goods; and 30 percent for local goods.  The third
phase was implemented through the issuance of four Executive
Orders:
a. EO 189 issued on January 1, 1994 to reduce tariff rates on
capital equipment and machinery;
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b. EO 204 issued on September 30, 1994 to lower tariff rates on
imported textiles, garments, and chemical inputs;
c. EO 264 issued on July 22, 1995 to reduce tariffs on 4,142
lines of the harmonized system (HS) in the manufacturing
sector. This is considered to be the biggest reform in the
tariff code; and
d. EO 288 introduced on January 1, 1996 to complement the
reform in 1995 through reduction of tariffs on nonsensitive
agricultural products.
In 1994, the Philippines formally acceded to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization
(GATT/WTO), binding the government to the various agreements
in the Uruguay Round (UR), including the Agreement on
Agriculture (AoA). Subsequently, the government amended and
revised its existing laws and policy measures to attune these to
the rules of the WTO. With the country’s accession to the WTO, it
committed to eliminate all its quantitative import restrictions on
agricultural products, except rice where the government asked
for special treatment.
To implement its commitments, Republic Act 8178 was
passed in 1996. Known as “An Act Replacing Quantitative Import
Restrictions on Agricultural Products, Except Rice, with Tariffs,
Creating the Agricultural Competitiveness Enhancement Fund,
and for Other Purposes,” it repealed the Magna Carta for Small
Farmers of 1991 and replaced all quantitative restrictions on
agricultural imports with tariffs that would substantially be
reduced over a period of 10 years. The government’s commitment
to the WTO-AoA allowed for an initial bound rate of 100 percent
for sensitive products, to be reduced in the next 10 years to 40-50
percent, considered the final bound rates. The government also
committed to provide minimum access for imported agricultural
products with tariff rates ranging from 30 to 50 percent right after
the ratification of the GATT-UR.  These are called in-quota tariff
rates as differentiated from the normal rates that are applied to
quantities of import exceeding the minimum access volume
(Development Forum 2002).8
Imposition of high-bound tariff rates and the subsequent
reversion to protectionist policies in agriculture did not help the
sector. Exports remained low, imports and farm gate prices
remained high, and the sector remained inward looking and
inefficient (Cororaton 2005). Declining output of agriculture
further pushed it downhill as it failed to supply the food needs of
the population. The sector was also unable to generate employment
and to compete in the world market.
Under this tariff restructuring regime, aggregate exports
expanded dramatically, overtaking aggregate imports, but growth
occurred in only a few sectors, particularly in manufacturing,
machinery, and transportation equipment. Growth and
productivity remained low in the agriculture sector, particularly
in raw materials, and animal and vegetable oils.  Notably, per
capita income has not changed, and there were mixed evidences
as to whether the reforms really helped to alleviate poverty and
improve income distribution in the country (Clarete et al. 2005).9
In 2001, China and ASEAN agreed to establish the China-
ASEAN FTA (CAFTA) within the next 10 years. The end goal is
to use the enhanced efficiency in third-country markets, as well
as to provide members with preferential entry to each other’s
markets.
For ASEAN, the agreement will provide first-mover
advantages in the Chinese market before it opens on a most favored
nation (MFN) basis, as well as provide opportunities for an Early
Harvest Program (EHP). The agreement also aims to address
various nontariff barrier concerns of ASEAN members.
In 2002, China and ASEAN signed a Framework on
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation. The agreement covers
tariff elimination on goods and services, investments, trade
facilitation, special and differential treatment, and expansion of
cooperation in various areas. The CAFTA provides three tracks
on liberalizing goods: Early Harvest, Normal Track, and Sensitive
Track.
The Normal Track is composed of two tracks: Normal Track
I and Normal Track II. In Normal Track I, the applied MFN tariff
rates shall be gradually reduced or eliminated over a period from
January 1, 2005 to 2010 for ASEAN-6 and China. For new ASEAN
member states, the period shall be from January 1, 2005 to 2015.
On the other hand, Normal Track II shall consist of products whose
tariffs have been reduced but not eliminated under Normal Track
I. Their respective tariffs shall be progressively eliminated within
timeframes to be mutually agreed between parties.2
Meanwhile, the Sensitive Track is divided into two
categories: Sensitive (SL) and Highly Sensitive (HSL) products. For
the SL, the initial target is reduction of tariff by 20 percent in 2012.
There is no pronounced commitment yet for products categorized
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2Department of Trade and Industry presentation on China-ASEAN FTA.10
under the HSL listing. The ending rates and dates for SL product
are 0-5 percent in 2018 and 50 percent for HSL in 2015.
The EHP covers chapters 1-8 of the Harmonized System
(Table 1).  It entails lowering tariff rates to three tiers (0%, 5%,
and 10%) by January 1, 2004, and eventually to zero tariff by
January 1, 2006 (Table 2). The final form of EHP is negotiated
bilaterally between China and each ASEAN member country.
The EHP aims to liberalize tariffs in priority sectors of
interest and to implement other trade and investment facilitation
measures that are deemed to generate immediate benefits to the
ASEAN and Chinese business communities. These measures
include:
Chapter              Description      Number of          Applicable ACFTA
     tariff lines rate of duty*
01 Live animals           19      0
02 Meat and edible meat offal           29      0
03 Fish and crustaceans, mollusks           73      0
and other aquatic invertebrates
04 Dairy produce; bird’s eggs;           22      0
natural honey; edible products of
animal origin, not elsewhere
specified or included
05 Products of animal origin, not           15                     0
elsewhere specified or included
06 Live trees and other plants; bulbs,           8                     0
roots and the like; cut flowers and
ornamental foliage
07 Edible vegetables and certain           20                     0
roots and tubers
Potatoes, fresh or chilled             1                     0
08 Edible fruits and nuts; peel of                 27                     0
citrus fruits or melons
TOTAL         214                     0
Table 1. Harmonized system chapters with corresponding number of tariff lines
under the Early Harvest Program of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area
*Starting January 1, 2006
Table 2. Early Harvest Program tariff reduction and elimination modality
Product Category          Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06
     >15%                        10%    5%    0%
     5%-15%                     5%    0%    0%
     <5%                            0%    0%    0%11
y Development and technical assistance to build capacity of
countries, particularly new ASEAN members, to improve
their competitiveness;
y Trade and investment facilitation measures;
y Trade policy dialogue;
y Facilitation of visa arrangement for business people;
y Standards and conformity assessment;
y Measures enhancing market access opportunities for specific
products or services to ASEAN and China, such as agricultural
and tropical products, textiles and clothing, machinery and
electronic products, footwear, oils and fats, foodstuffs,
forestry and aquaculture products, and energy; and
y Extension of MFN treatment of China’s accession
commitments to non-WTO members of ASEAN in compliance
with WTO rules.
A study conducted by the ASEAN-China Expert Group in
2001 showed that the participating countries are expected to
benefit from this agreement. In the case of the Philippines, it is
expected to gain a 0.32-percent increase in GDP from this FTA
(Table 3).
Country Real GDP Increase % Increase
US$ Million US$ Million
Indonesia 204031.4   2267.8      1.12
Malaysia                       98032.3                  1133.5      1.17
Philippines                       71167.1                    229.1      0.32
Singapore                       72734.9                    753.3      1.05
Thailand                     165516.0                    673.6      0.41
Vietnam                       16110.9                    339.1      2.15
China                     815163.0                  2214.9      0.27
Table 3. Impact on real GDP of the ASEAN-China FTA
Source: ASEAN-China Expert Group (2001)12
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Signed on April 27, 2005, the Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) between the Philippines and China for an
EHP took effect on January 1, 2006. The government approved
the grant of zero tariffs on 214 tariff lines in compliance with the
said MOU (see Tables 1 and 2). The Philippines hopes to gain
larger and easier market access for its tropical fruits, coconut
products, and aquatic and seafood products. China, on the other
hand, can potentially provide supplementary supply of agricultural
products that are in short supply in the Philippines. Considering
that China is a top trading partner of the Philippines (China ranked
4th in 2005 as Philippines’ trade partner), the government hopes
that it can help boost the sluggish performance of the agriculture
sector.
Under the China-Philippines EHP, the following products
are covered to meet the mandatory product coverage of chapters
1-8: live breeding animals and other live animals, meat of sheep,
goats, horses, meat of bovine animals, fish (live, chilled or frozen,
dried), ornamental fish, crustaceans, mollusks, milk and cream,
live plants, fruits and vegetables (including desiccated coconut,
bananas, pineapples, mangoes), coconut oil (Chapter 15), and
cocoa powder (Chapter 18). Products excluded from chapters 1-8
are placed either in the Normal Track or in the Sensitive Track.
The Philippines was the last ASEAN member country to
conclude its negotiations with China. This was primarily because
the country’s sensitivity was concentrated on the target scope of
the EHP that covered raw, unprocessed agricultural products in
chapters 1-8 of the Tariff Code. Furthermore, negotiations slowed
down as a result of intensive lobbying by affected sectors,
particularly sugar, pork and poultry, rice and corn, and vegetable.
With pressure building up from both sides, the Philippine
government was eventually able to come up with a package that13
sufficiently represented the strategic interest of the agriculture
sector, which was, at the same time, acceptable to China. The
Philippine government was able to throw in lines outside of
chapters 1-8, particularly coconut oil and cocoa powder, products
in which the country has a comparative advantage.
For the EHP, total utilization value was at US$ 975,934,
the bulk of which came from edible fruits and peel of citrus or
melons, while the rest came from edible vegetables and certain
roots and tubers, and cocoa and cocoa preparations.
Tariff Description ACFTA Rate Country of Value In
Code    Origin US$
7 Edible vegetables            0      CN             194,619.40
and certain roots
and tubers
8 Edible fruits and nuts;      0      CN             770,369.84
peel of citrus fruits or
melons
18 Cocoa and cocoa            0      CN                   10,945.27
preparations
TOTAL             975,934.51
Table 4. Philippine Form E utilization under the Early Harvest Program,
January-May 2006
Source: DTI ASEAN-China FTA Presentation14
Various comprehensive models almost consistently showed
positive benefits of the ASEAN-China FTA for individual countries
as a whole. These results are expected, since the resulting openness
in such a large grouping of countries can only lead to better
resource allocation.  However, these benefits have underlying short-
run adjustment costs that are important to understand.  This
section attempts to focus on what the short-run impacts can be,
and possibly, how productivity measures can affect said impacts.
In estimating the potential short-run ramifications of an
EHP, the paper refers to a simulation exercise conducted by Prenio
et al. (2005), which evaluated the impact of an EHP in effective
protection rates (EPRs), output, employment and income, demand,
and trade balance.
The simulation used the Chung Lee Model, a partial
equilibrium-type mathematical model based on the input-output
(IO) table and most often used in policymaking. Said model was
developed for the Tariff Commission in the early 1980s and was
further extended by incorporating factor productivity growth in
agriculture.
Total factor productivity (TFP) addresses any effect in total
output not caused by inputs or productivity. Technology growth
and efficiency are regarded as two of the biggest subsections of
TFP3. The simulation made downward adjustment of input
requirements of every sector in agriculture by a factor of 2 and 4
percent.
The model is partial equilibrium in nature in that it assumes
zero cross-price elasticity and it cannot incorporate other factors
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3http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_factor_productivity15
such as investment behavior and monetary variables.  These
shortcomings limit the analysis to comparative statics. The
advantage of the model, however, is its multisectoral, input-output
framework, which best highlights the variation in EPRs and the
varying effects of trade reforms across sectors. It also incorporates,
to some extent, linkages among the sectors.
The estimated figures are expected to help provide an initial
assessment of the effect of tariff reforms that will allow
policymakers to identify the sectors that will benefit and lose from
the tariff rate changes in terms of the impact on output,
employment, income, and the trade balance.
Following are the results of the simulation exercise
conducted by Prenio et al.:
Effective Protection Rates
Out of the 11 sectors in agriculture and food manufacturing
that receive double-digit EPRs, three ended up with lower levels
of protection upon implementation of the EHP. These are
vegetables, hog, meat, and meat product processing. There was a
significant fall in the EPRs of these products. The rest either retained
or slightly improved their EPRs. Citrus fruits and fruits and nuts
also suffered reduction in EPR.
Output, Employment, and Income
The EHP is expected to have a minimal impact on major
macrovariables. Overall output will decrease by 0.18 percent and
the bulk of this will be accounted for by food manufacturing and
partly by agriculture. The rest of the industries are not expected to
alter their production as a result of the EHP. Even if only a few
sectors had a significant decline in their EPRs, these are the ones
that have a significant contribution to total domestic production.
Based on output ranking of traded sectors, all three are within the
top 50 contributors.
Wage bill in agriculture also registers contraction relative
to food manufacturing’s wage bill, which implies that sectors
adversely affected by the EHP are those coming from the relatively
labor-intensive sectors.16
Gross value added or income, however, will fall by a
fractionally larger amount (0.66%) since lower production is
accompanied by a decline in domestic prices (as a result of lower
tariff rates). Agriculture will take on a larger cut as its GVA declines
by almost 2 percent compared to food manufacturing’s 0.78
percent.
Demand
No radical change is expected in intermediate demand
except for a relatively larger fall in food manufacturing because it
has a relatively high level of intra-industry linkage. Many industries
Output                 No TFP         With TFP 2%  With TFP 4%
   Agriculture -0.80 -0.72 -0.64
   Food mfg. -0.18 -0.18 -0.18
   Others 0.00 0.00 0.00
   All industries -0.18 -0.16 -0.15
GVA
   Agriculture -1.99 -0.77 0.46
   Food mfg. -0.78 -0.78 -0.78
   Others 0.00 0.00 0.00
   All industries -0.66 -0.31 0.05
Wage bill
   Agriculture -0.89 -0.80 -0.72
   Food mfg. -0.14 -0.14 -0.14
   Others -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Intermediate Demand
   Agriculture -0.07 -0.37 -0.68
   Food mfg. -0.63 -1.14 -1.64
   Others -0.02 -0.25 -0.31
   All industries -0.07 -0.33 -0.46
Final Demand
   Agriculture 0.33 0.40 0.47
   Food mfg. 0.74 0.91 1.09
   Others -0.83 -0.38 0.07
   All industries -0.33 -0.01 0.31
Imports
   Agriculture 30.99 26.89 22.80
   Food mfg. 5.84 5.20 4.59
   Others -0.56 -0.54 -0.32
Exports
   Agriculture -0.07 0.18 0.43
   Food mfg. 1.22 1.27 1.31
   Others 0.30 0.20 0.07
Trade balance
   Agriculture -2,449,677.75 -2,086,941.63 -1,725,692.75
   Food mfg. -625,032.69 -479,273.44 -338,719.69
   Others 3,478,142.50 3,099,735.00 1,683,282.13
   All industries 403,432.06 533,520.00 -381,130.00
Table 5. Aggregate simulation results for EHP (in percent)17
within food manufacturing are adversely affected by the EHP and
their outputs are expected to decline, which in turn, lower their
demand for intermediate inputs.  On the other hand, more changes
are expected to occur in final demand. It picks up slightly for
agriculture and food manufacturing because the lower import duty
also lowers domestic prices. The rest suffer a decline in demand
even if their prices remain unchanged because of an overall decline
in income or GVA.
Trade
The overall trade balance is expected to have a positive net
change as a result of the EHP. Imports for agriculture goods are
expected to increase sharply (31%) while exports are expected to
decline marginally (-0.07%) due to an increase in domestic
consumption, largely in final demand, coupled with a decline in
production. Food manufacturing will have a positive change in
both imports (5.84%) and exports (1.22%) although the net
increment in the trade balance is negative. Since input cost is lower
for food manufacturing, exporting firms have a greater incentive
to sell their produce in the world market. However, producers
catering to the domestic market will be unable to meet domestic
demand since their output is expected to decline when tariff
protection goes down. For the other sectors, the decline in domestic
demand will lead to an overall net decline in imports (0.56%) and
a slight increase in exports (0.3%).
Select Sectors in Agriculture and Food Manufacturing
Among agriculture goods, the hog sector is the most
adversely affected (Table 6). Its output and GVA are expected to
contract by 3.5 percent and 10 percent, respectively, since its tariff
rate was reduced from 26.2 to 15 percent under the EHP.  Similarly,
the import-competing component of the meat and meat product
processing sector also suffers a considerable decline in its EPR,
which leads to a decline in its output and income. The sector’s
export-competing component, on the other hand, actually has a
slight increase in its output and income since raw materials (hog,
in particular) become cheaper.18
Table 6. EHP results for selected agriculture and food manufacturing sectors:
Impact on major sectors -- percentage change
Output           No TFP        With TFP         With TFP
               2% 4%
Agriculture
Corn-MM 0 0.1 0.21
Corn-MX 0 0.06 0.12
Vegetable-MM -1.68 -1.61 -1.55
Vegetable-MX 0.06 0.11 0.17
Banana-PX 0 0 0
Coconut-PX 0 0.04 0.08
Coffee-PX 0 0.07 0.14
Rice & Corn Milling-PM 0 0.05 0.09
Hog-PM -3.54 -3.32 -3.09
Food mfg.
Meat & meat processing-MM -9.68 -9.68 -9.68
Meat & meat processing-MX 0.27 0.27 0.27
Sugar milling-MM 0 0 0
Sugar milling-MX 0 0 0
Coffee roasting & processing-MM 0 0 0
Coffee roasting & processing-MX 0.13 0.13 0.13
G VA
Agriculture
Corn-MM 0 0.83 1.67
Corn-MX 0 0.46 0.92
Vegetable-MM -2.44 -2 -1.56
Vegetable-MX 0.25 0.63 0.17
Banana-PX 0.01 0.97 1.93
Coconut-PX 0 0.32 0.65
Coffee-PX 0 0.5 1
Rice & Corn milling-PM 0 2.16 4.33
Hog-PM -10.25 -8.4 -6.55
Food mfg.
Meat & meat processing-MM -62.89 -62.89 -62.89
Meat & meat processing-MX 1.47 1.47 1.47
Sugar milling-MM 0.02 0.02 0.02
Sugar milling-MX 0.01 0.01 0.01
Coffee roasting & processing-MM 0.81 0.81 0.81
Coffee roasting & processing-MX 0.47 0.47 0.47
Imports
Agriculture
Corn-MM 0.28 -14.9 -30.08
 Vegetable-MM 44.51 39.27 34.11
Rice & corn milling-PM -8.96 -8.72 -8.44
Hog-PM 75.46 71.76 68.1
Food manufacturing
Meat & meat processing-MM 64.08 64.6 65.12
Sugar milling-MM -2.46 -1.46 -0.46
Coffee roasting & processing -0.79 -0.36 0.06
Exports
Agriculture
Corn-MX -0.02 2.73 5.52
Vegetable-MX 0.54 1.05 1.56
Banana-PX 0.05 0.11 0.16
Coconut-PX -0.34 0.22 0.78
Coffee-PX 2.69 6.26 9.84
Food manufacturing
Meat & meat processing-MX 1.31 1.02 0.74
Sugar milling-MX 0.48 0.29 0.09
Coffee roasting & processing-MX 1 0.66 0.3519
Total Factor Productivity Improvement in Agriculture
Effective protection rates
Improving the efficiency of factor use in agriculture is going
to improve EPRs of sectors within the industry. The EPRs of other
sectors outside agriculture remain unaffected since none of the
variables used for EPR computations (cost of inputs and output
price) are affected by improving TFP in agriculture (Table 7).
Compared to basic simulation figures, EPRs improve the most for
exporting sectors.
Output, employment, and income
Factor productivity improvement in agriculture can be
expected to soften the impact of the EHP on output and income,
but unfortunately, it is limited only within the industry. Results
show that output decline for agriculture is reduced from -0.8
percent in the basic simulation to -0.72 and -0.64 percent for the
2-percent and the 4-percent TFP scenarios, respectively. Outputs
of the rest remain unchanged from the basic simulation. Like
output, the fall in the wage bill (hence, employment) is softened
by the introduction of TFP but only for the agriculture industry.
Income is influenced more by factor productivity improvement
but like output, it is limited only to agriculture. A 2-percent TFP
improvement reduces income by more than half, from 1.99 percent
in the basic simulation to only 0.77 percent. This loss is reduced
further to 0.46 percent under the 4-percent TFP scenario.
Demand
Intermediate demand is estimated to decline further
because the improving factor productivity in the agriculture
industry lowers its input requirements and a large chunk of this
also comes from within the sector.
Trade
The increase in agriculture production and the general
decline in intermediate demand are expected to lower imports
and provide an opportunity to increase exports. Overall trade
balance is expected to improve by incorporating factor
productivity.20
Table 7. Impact of Early Harvest Program on total factor productivity (TFP)-
improvement in agriculture and manufacturing sectors
                                           Tariff Rates Effective Protection Rates
                2003                 EHP                2003                 EHP               TFP 2%              TFP 4%
Agriculture
MM002 27.00% 27.00% 30.29% 30.29% 30.74% 31.19%
MM003 10.78% 5.00% 11.41% 11.41% 5.43% 5.67%
MM008 7.00% 5.00% 7.89% 5.40% 5.90% 6.40%
MM009 5.97% 5.00% 6.41% 5.29% 5.62% 5.94%
MM013 3.00% 3.00% 3.02% 3.02% 3.58% 4.13%
MM018 3.08% 3.08% 3.09% 3.09% 3.24% 3.39%
MX002 -0.97% -0.97% -0.77% -0.57%
MX003 -0.50% -0.32% -0.12% 0.07%
MX008 -0.52% -0.52% -0.2 0.13%
MX009 -0.33% -0.32% -0.11% 0.10%
MX013 -0.63% -0.63% -0.19% 0.26%
MX018 -0.18% -0.18% -0.05% 0.07%
PM016 3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 3.33% 3.65%
PM017 3.00% 3.00% 3.02% 3.02% 3.29% 3.55%
PM019 26.20% 15.00% 34.48% 18.62% 19.62% 20.62%
PX005 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
PX006 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
PX007 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
PX010 -0.16% -0.16% -0.02% 0.11%
PX015 -0.22% -0.22% 0.00% 0.23%
Food manufacturing
MM039 37.64% 15.00% 45.36% 17.20% 17.20% 17.20%
MM044 8.40% 8.40% 18.66% 19.69% 19.69% 19.69%
MM048 5.08% 5.08% 3.83% 6.92% 6.92% 6.92%
MM051 6.00% 6.00% 11.93% 11.93% 11.93% 11.93%
MM052 16.67% 16.67% 27.59% 28.51% 28.51% 28.51%
MM053 10.00% 10.00% 12.93% 13.00% 13.00% 13.00%
MM054 28.65% 28.65% 31.99% 31.99% 31.99% 31.99%
MM055 6.55% 6.55% 2.22% 3.13% 3.13% 3.13%
MM058 44.17% 44.17% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
MM059 5.58% 5.58% -1.61% -0.24% -0.24% -0.24%
MM060 7.73% 7.73% 6.59% 6.59% 6.59% 6.59%
MM061 5.29% 5.29% 4.47% 4.64% 4.64% 4.64%
MM062 6.48% 6.48% 10.31% 10.93% 10.93% 10.93%
MX039 -1.65% -1.12% -1.12% -1.12%
MX044 -2.58% -1.89% -1.89% -1.89%
MX048 -5.74% -3.35% -3.35% -3.35%
MX051 -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21%
MX052 -4.48% -3.94% -3.94% -3.94%
MX053 -5.59% -5.55% -5.55% -5.55%
MX054 -0.26% -0.25% -0.25% -0.25%
MX055 -7.26% -6.79% -6.79% -6.79%
MX058 -1.85% -1.58% -1.58% -1.58%
MX059 -8.73% -7.75% -7.75% -7.75%
MX060 -3.32% -3.32% -3.32% -3.32%
MX061 -3.07% -2.95% -2.95% -2.95%
MX062 -2.65% -2.28% -2.28% -2.28%
PM040 4.60% 0.00% 2.30% -7.27% -7.27% -7.27%
PM041 5.18% 5.00% 6.21% 9.21% 9.21% 9.21%
PM043 6.80% 5.00% 8.46% 5.41% 5.41% 5.41%
PM050 66.94% 66.94% 71.86% 71.86% 72.13% 72.40%
PX045 -7.52% -6.38% -6.38% -6.38%
PX046 -5.19% -4.32% -4.32% -4.32%
PX047 -0.57% -0.53% -0.53% -0.53%
PX049 -2.24% -1.76% -1.76% -1.76%
PX056 -0.45% -0.45% -0.45% -0.45%21
Select sectors in agriculture and food manufacturing
The impact of incorporating TFP assumption is most evident
on incomes of sectors in agriculture. Rice and corn milling, in
particular, will move from 0 percent in the basic simulation to 2.16
percent and 4.33 percent under the 2-percent and the 4-percent TFP
assumptions. Moreover, income losses suffered by the hog and
vegetable sectors are expected to be minimized by an average of 20
percent. There is some movement in import activity but changes in
exports are much more significant. The increase in coffee exports in
the basic scenario more than doubles with a 2-percent TFP, and
increasing by another 50 percent when the TFP assumption is raised
to 2 percent.
Remarks on Results of Simulation Exercise
Because of inter-industry linkage, the EHP’s impact is spread
to other sectors, such that even if tariffs are applied to only one sector,
they eventually have an effect on other sectors as well.
The simulation exercise also showed that an EHP will affect
output, income, employment, demand, and trade balance. These
changes will have an impact on social welfare. An increase in the
general price level and income implied a decline in the consumption
basket of the average consumer, hence a lower consumer surplus.
Movements in the price of food, which comprise the bulk of a
consumer’s expenditure, will have a greater impact on welfare. While
this is not explicitly captured in the model, it is evident that changes
in tariff that will take place with an EHP will have this kind of impact
on social welfare. Notably, this shows the importance of improving
factor productivity to mitigate the adverse impact of changes in the
tariff regime as it reduces the dependence of firms on tariff protection.
Finally, it cannot be overemphasized that the simulation results
are aimed to show only short-run impacts of the EHP, which are
bound to be negative for sectors whose effective protection rates
declined.  In addition, the simulation exercise uses a partial equilibrium
model, in contrast with the more full-blown GTAP modeling done by
ASEAN experts. Moreover, the simulation exercise assumed full
coverage of EHP for the Philippines that did not actually materialize
(with a positive list of only around half of the total number of items).
Hence, the negative impacts from the simulation are not only short-
run but would tend to be overestimated.22
To meet the China challenge, as well as the broader
challenge of globalization, the Philippine agriculture system should
hasten the pace of domestic reforms and restructuring to maintain
international competitiveness and provide the foundation for
sustained growth.
The country should build its own strength and
competitiveness in order to create a mutually beneficial relationship
with China. Based on the simulation exercise, a number of sectors
are vulnerable, foremost of which are the sectors of vegetables,
hog, and meat and meat processing. Assistance to these sectors is
needed through either technological support or product
diversification to make them more efficient.
Short-run simulation of the effects of the EHP reveal
vulnerable sectors, notably importable vegetables and hogs, and
the negative impact on agriculture. Nonetheless, it should be
recognized that the EHP has also opened a sizable window of
opportunity to other sectors. During a forum conducted with
stakeholders, there were some products identified where the
Philippines has competitiveness and which can serve as an
alternative livelihood for farmers who might be displaced by the
EHP. The natural ingredients market was identified as a potentially
big export market for the Philippines that does not really need
huge capital to be developed.  Other products that are also
potentially very competitive are poultry, crops, and fisheries.
Coconut has a lot of potential as well, most especially coconut oil
and medicinal products derived from coconut. These products
comprise the bulk of agriculture production in the country and
can be further tapped to enhance industry growth. With proper
domestic support, there is no reason the Philippines would not be
able to take advantage of these opportunities.  But perhaps more
importantly, as shown by the simulation exercise where factor
productivity enhancement was included, the needed support
would soften the negative impact of the EHP.
VIII
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations23
By and large, it is the small farmers and producers that
bear the brunt of trade agreements. This is because they lack access
to fallback mechanisms such as credit and insurance. As such,
the plight of the small farmers should be considered in this FTA
and proper support and social safety nets should also be put in
place.
Liberalization works best if complemented by
socioeconomic policies that support the transition to a more
market-responsive economy by addressing constraints in
production, and creating a strong network of institutions that
facilitate the implementation of these policies. Among the nontrade
domestic factors that should be seriously looked into are:
y Investment in rural infrastructure. Of particular importance is
investment in transportation and telecommunication
infrastructure, and postharvest facilities (package, handling,
and storage facilities).
y Investment in productivity particularly research and extension
activities, e.g., improved skills and information for the
farmers, integration of farmer participation and control, and
collaboration with community organizations.
y Land policies and institutions. The assignment of well-defined
and secure property rights to land can be expected to have
direct benefits by increasing farmers’ ability to produce for
both subsistence and income generation, incentives to invest
in and sustainably manage land, and the ability to obtain
credit. Secured property rights in land also indirectly benefit
the emergence of more efficient farm structures. Land reform
still remains a major issue, not just for the Philippines, but
for the entire region as well. In the case of the Philippines, it
has encountered political difficulties in implementation.
David (1999) states that the various provisions of the land
reform programs, combined with slow implementation, have
increased land market distortions with unintended negative
effects.
y Credit policies and institutions. Lack of credit access is a
perennial problem faced by small entrepreneurs. The
government should be able to provide financial services that24
are tailored to the needs of the farmers. This should be
supported by strong and consistent institutions that will
provide cost-effective enforcement of financial contracts.
y Governance and institutional reform. Meaningful and sustainable
reforms require institutions that adhere to the principles of
transparency, accountability, and participatory processes. This
should also be accompanied by institutions that will provide
adequate administrative support to the reforms. More
importantly, the government should have the political will
and the management capability to ensure implementation of
the needed reforms.25
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